Pledging, Populism, and the Paris Agreement: The Paradox of a Management-Based Approach to Global Governance by Coglianese, Cary
Maryland Journal of International Law 
Volume 34 Issue 1 Article 7 
Pledging, Populism, and the Paris Agreement: The Paradox of a 
Management-Based Approach to Global Governance 
Cary Coglianese 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil 
Recommended Citation 
Cary Coglianese, Pledging, Populism, and the Paris Agreement: The Paradox of a Management-Based 
Approach to Global Governance, 34 Md. J. Int'l L. 139 (2019). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol34/iss1/7 
This Symposium: Articles and Essays is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at 
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an 
authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact 
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu. 
139 
Pledging, Populism, and the Paris Agreement: 
The Paradox of a Management-Based 
Approach to Global Governance 
CARY COGLIANESE† 
   The adoption of the Paris Agreement in late 2015 marked a his-
toric breakthrough in legal efforts to stave off the ravages of the 
planet’s changing climate.1  Nations had struggled for more than two 
decades to forge a strong global agreement on reductions in green-
house gas emissions.2  With the Paris Agreement, the nations of the 
world finally pledged together to reduce emissions in an effort to limit 
the increase in global mean temperature to below two degrees Celsius 
over pre-industrial levels—and, even more ambitiously, to try to aim 
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1.  Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].  
2. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in 1992,
reflects the first major effort to move toward global agreement on climate change, by offering 
a framework for future negotiations. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (1992) [hereinafter 
UNFCCC]. The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, committed a few dozen nations to reduc-
tions in greenhouse gas emissions, but it was widely viewed as a failure and never received 
ratification by the United States. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
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to keep any increase to below 1.5 degrees Celsius.3  With support from 
leaders from the world’s major economies, every nation in the world 
has now signed onto an agreement that not only acknowledges the “ur-
gent threat” created by greenhouse gas emissions, but also puts in place 
a structure for nations to move forward to respond to that threat.4  
Despite the significant breakthrough that the Paris Agreement 
represented, the forging of this accord could very well prove to be the 
highwater mark in global cooperation over climate change for some 
time to come.  Indeed, it took little time before the Agreement’s effec-
tiveness would be cast into considerable doubt.  In June 2017, Presi-
dent Donald J. Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United 
States from the Agreement, and his administration is taking steps to 
roll back domestic regulations aimed at achieving U.S. commitments 
made under the accord.5  Without the continued leadership of the 
United States, and with the rise of various populist movements around 
the world, other countries’ commitment to the goals of the global 
Agreement appears at risk of wavering as well.6  
3. Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.1. A total of 195 countries have signed the Paris
Agreement, the same number of states currently recognized by the United Nations. See Status 
of Treaties: 7.d Paris Agreement, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un. 
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27& clang=_en 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2019); see also Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present, 
U.N., http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-
present/index.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2019); Non-Member States, U.N., http://www.un.org/en/sec-
tions/member-states/non-member-states/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2019). The Agreement has been
ratified by 185 countries and entered into force in November 2016. Paris Agreement – Status
of Ratification, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-
of-ratification (last visited May 5, 2019).
4. Paris Agreement, supra note 1.
5. Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal from the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 373 (June 
1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-
climate-accord/; see also, e.g., Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman, How Trump Is Ensuring 
That Greenhouse Gas Emissions Will Rise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/11/26/climate/trump-greenhouse-gas-emissions.html (noting that “Trump 
has made the dismantling of policies to curb greenhouse pollution a centerpiece of his dereg-
ulatory agenda”). 
6. See, e.g., David A. Graham, Can Anyone Fill the U.S. Leadership Vacuum on Climate
Change?, THE ATLANTIC (June 25, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-
chive/2018/06/can-anyone-fill-the-us-leadership-vacuum-on-climate-change/563594/ (quot-
ing former Obama Administration climate negotiator Todd Stern as saying that “[i]f the U.S. 
is not in there, the likelihood that you’re going to get other countries doing their best is just 
reduced”); Brady Dennis et al., ‘1,000 Little Steps’: Global Climate Talks End in Progress but 
Fail to Address the Galloping Pace of Climate Change, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/12/15/negotiators-strike-deal-glo bal-
climate-talks-questions-linger-over-whether-it-measures-up/?utm_term=.76a874073e42 (discuss-
ing the implications of wavering commitments for the climate talks held in Poland in late 
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The complications that have confronted the early implementation 
of the Paris Agreement reveal more than just the persistent challenges 
associated with international cooperation.  They also reflect structural 
limitations inherent in the Agreement’s approach to climate govern-
ance.  Its basic scheme—sometimes described by analysts as “pledge 
and review”7—depends on each nation declaring its own climate miti-
gation goals and developing plans to achieve those goals through do-
mestic policy interventions.8  The Agreement itself does not impose 
any substantive requirement that countries reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Instead, it imposes an obligation that countries announce 
their own “nationally determined contributions” to the global effort to 
reduce emissions.9  It does not make nations’ self-determined emis-
sion-reduction goals legally binding.  Instead, it relies on a hope that, 
with transparent reporting of each country’s goals and its progress to-
ward meeting them, countries will be confronted with political and dip-
lomatic pressure to reduce emissions.10    
Although the Paris Agreement was historic in its formation, it was 
far from novel in its structure.  Its reliance on self-determined goals 
and plans, without any binding legal obligation to meet those goals and 
plans, has a direct parallel in domestic law to the regulatory strategy 
known as “management-based regulation.”11  Management-based reg-
2018); Ernesto Londoño & Lisa Friedman, Brazil Backs Out of Hosting 2019 Climate Change 
Meeting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 11/28/world/ameri-
cas/brazil-climate-meeting.html; Jonathan Watts & Ben Doherty, US and Russia Ally with 
Saudi Arabia to Water Down Climate Pledge, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/environment/2018/dec/09/us-russia-ally-saudi-arabia-water-down-climate-pledges-un. 
7. See, e.g., Gabriel Weil, Incentive Compatible Climate Change Mitigation: Moving
Beyond the Pledge and Review Model, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL. REV. 923 (2018); 
William A. Pizer, Practical Global Climate Policy, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: 
ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD 280 (Joseph E. Aldy & 
Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007). The idea of a bottom-up, pledge-and-review approach to inter-
national climate cooperation dates back at least to the 1990s. See Katarina Buhr et al., Climate 
Change Politics Through a Global Pledge-and-Review Regime: Positions Among Negotiators 
and Stakeholders, 6 SUSTAINABILITY 794, 795 (2014) (noting that this approach “was dis-
cussed already in the 1990s . . . in drafting the UNFCCC, and seriously revitalized with the 
2009 Copenhagen Accord”). 
8. Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.2.
9. Id.
10. Fatima Maria Ahmad et. al., The Paris Agreement Presents a Flexible Approach for
US Climate Policy, 11 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 283, 284 (2017) (noting that a nationally 
determined contribution “is not a legally binding obligation, nor is a country bound to partic-
ular policies by which to achieve its target” and that, “[r]ather than rely on punitive legal en-
forcement measures, the Paris Agreement provides a framework that creates a continuous cy-
cle to take advantage of peer and public pressure to motivate countries….”). 
11. See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Pre-
scribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003).  The 
Paris Agreement’s approach is also generally consistent with what Abram Chayes and Antonia 
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ulation is characterized by its requirement that regulated entities de-
velop their own objectives for achieving regulatory goals and create 
their own plans for achieving those objectives.12  Its approach to regu-
lation has been used by governments around the world to address a 
wide variety of domestic policy concerns, such as food safety, occupa-
tional health and safety, environmental protection, domestic security, 
and the reduction of catastrophic industrial risk.13 As a result, the find-
ings from research on these and other uses of regulation at the domestic 
level provide a window into what can realistically be expected from 
the Paris Agreement.14  
The main conclusion to draw from domestic regulation is that a 
management-based approach to governance presents a paradox.15 Un-
der many circumstances, management-based regulation will prove to 
be the best strategy available—perhaps even the only realistic strategy 
Handler Chayes have called a “managerial model” of international treaty design. ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) (discussing management-oriented fea-
tures of transnational regimes, such as transparency, monitoring, and assessment, which can 
promote compliance with international legal obligations). Of course, Chayes and Chayes focus 
on the use of management tools as strategies for promoting compliance with international 
norms, whereas the Paris Agreement in an important sense goes a step further by making man-
agement the international norm itself (not just a means for promoting compliance with other 
norms) and by leaving the creation of substantive norms to each country and its policy man-
agement process. 
12. Id.
13. Cary Coglianese, Management-Based Regulation: Implications for Public Policy, in
RISK AND REG. POL’Y: IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE OF RISK 159, 163-65, 176-77 (Gregory 
Bounds & Nikolai Malyshev eds., 2010); Designing Safety Regulations for High-Hazard In-
dustries, NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED. 126–37 (2018), https://www.nap.edu/cata 
log/24907/designing-safety-regulations-for-high-hazard-industries.  
14. Most of the literature on regulation assumes that both government regulators and
regulated entities behave rationally, responding to the incentives and disincentives in their 
environment. States are also often assumed to act rationally on the international stage, meaning 
that they too respond to incentives and disincentives. Recognizing that the political leaders 
who operate states confront different incentives and a different decision-making environment 
than do the managers who run businesses, it nevertheless holds that what researchers have 
learned about behvavior at the level of the firm can provide some insights about behavior at 
the level of the state. At the end of the day, just as businesses are run by people, so are 
governments. Cf. Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of 
Treaty Design, 53 VIRG. J. INTL. L. 309 (2013) (“[S]tate ratification decisions are made by 
people, and … these people are in turn usually answerable to other people” which means that 
“there are multiple plausible pathways by which state decisionmaking could reflect” individual 
decision-making.). 
15. I am not the only one to highlight paradoxical aspects of the Paris Agreement. In the
lead-up to the final negotiations in Paris, for example, Stéphane Dion and Eloi Laurent de-
scribe a different “Paris Paradox,” one that involves “an unprecedented universal climate 
agreement that will not solve our climate crisis.” Stéphane Dion & Eloi Laurent, Climate Ac-
tion Beyond the Paris Accord 2 (OFCE, Working Paper No. 2015-22, 2015), 
https://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/dtravail/WP2015-22.pdf. 
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available16—and yet, due to its inherent structural limitations, a man-
agement-based strategy will also often only provide weak assurances 
of forward momentum.17  Such appears to be the case with the Paris 
Agreement.  A strategy that allows each country to develop its own 
goals almost certainly reflects the best that could be achieved to secure 
a global agreement of any kind on climate change.18  In that limited 
sense, the Paris Agreement can clearly be said to be better than doing 
nothing—and, thus, its importance should not be dismissed—but the 
Agreement still leaves most of the impetus for climate progress in the 
hands of national leaders.  Even before President Trump’s announce-
ment of a U.S. retreat from the international accord, little reason ex-
isted to expect the Paris Agreement to deliver major behavioral change 
over the long term. Not only does the Agreement leave it to each mem-
ber state itself to select its own climate goals, but the Agreement also 
relies largely on shaming on the international stage as its main incen-
tive for compliance, a weak mechanism that will matter little to leaders 
facing provincial populism at home.19    
In Part I of this Article, I explain what management-based regu-
lation entails and show in greater detail how the Paris Agreement 
adopted a management-based governance strategy.  In Part II, I draw 
on social science research on domestic applications of management-
based regulation to show both the appropriate role for and the key lim-
itations of a management-based governance strategy—and I explain 
what these research findings indicate for the Paris Agreement.  In Part 
III, I suggest that the Paris Agreement’s reliance on a management-
16. Susan Biniaz, former Deputy Legal Advisor at the U.S. State Department and an
instrumental participant in the negotiations that led to the Paris Agreement, has described the 
Agreement’s "nationally determined" approach as being much like Winston Churchill’s as-
sessment of democracy: “the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that 
have been tried from time to time.” Susan Biniaz, Remarks at the Yale Environmental Dia-
logue (Feb 8, 2019) (quoting Winston Churchill, Speech before the House of Commons, 444 
Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1947) 207 (U.K.)).       
17. See Cary Coglianese, The Managerial Turn in Environmental Policy, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L. J. 54, 70 (2008) (noting that “the very challenges that make management-based 
strategies attractive . . . also present challenges in overseeing the management government 
encourages or requires”). 
18. See Jean Galbraith, The Legal Structure of the Paris Agreement, REG. REV. (Dec. 21,
2015), https://www.theregreview.org/2015/12/21/galbraith-legal-structure-paris-agreement/ 
(explaining that “the international legal obligations imposed by the Paris Agreement [needed 
to] be ones that, in the view of U.S. executive branch lawyers, the United States [could] join 
through sole Presidential action without needing the approval of the Senate or Congress” and 
that “[p]rocess-based commitments are more likely to meet this standard than are substance-
based commitments”). 
19. See Jennifer Jacquet & Dale Jamieson, Soft but Significant Power in the Paris Agree-
ment, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 643 (2016) (discussing the importance of shaming as the 
principal mechanism for ensuring compliance with the Paris Agreement). 
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based strategy will likely prove to be even less effectual than domestic 
application of management-based regulation because compliance with 
the Paris Agreement depends on weak reputational incentives.  Alt-
hough the Paris Agreement attempts to bring international pressure to 
bear on national leaders, its success depends ultimately, even if para-
doxically, on domestic politics.  The rising tide of populism that has 
characterized domestic politics in major countries around the world in 
recent years appears likely, unless turned back, to undermine severely 
the implementation of the Paris Agreement.  
I. THE PARIS AGREEMENT’S MANAGEMENT-BASED APPROACH
To appreciate the management-based nature of the Paris Agree-
ment and the implications that follow from that nature, it helps to begin 
by situating management-based regulation within the larger legal 
toolkit available to policymakers.  That toolkit is certainly a vast one, 
as evidenced by the proliferation of complex, detailed laws governing 
economic activity today.  Yet despite the profusion of laws at both the 
international and domestic level, any law or regulation can be under-
stood as fitting into one of four main types—only one of which is man-
agement-based regulation.20  It is important to understand all four types 
to see what makes management-based regulation distinctive and to 
comprehend its limitations.  This Part thus begins by defining manage-
ment-based regulation by reference to the other tools in the regulatory 
toolkit; then it uses examples from domestic policy to illustrate what 
management-based regulation entails; and finally, it explains why the 
Paris Agreement is a management-based regulation applied at the level 
of international law. 
A. Situating Management-Based Regulation in the
Regulatory Toolkit
The classification of legal tools into four main types stems from 
differences in two key characteristics.  The first characteristic lies in 
the kind of obligation the law imposes: means or ends.21  Some laws 
oblige individuals or organizations to engage in (or avoid) particular 
means or actions—such as installing pollution control equipment—
20. The four-fold typology of regulatory instruments presented here derives initially from
Cary Coglianese, Management-Based Regulation: Implications for Public Policy, OECD Pa-
per No. GOV/PGC/REG (2008) 5 (Mar. 25, 2008), https://www.oecd.org/gov/ regulatory-pol-
icy/41628947.pdf.  See also Coglianese, supra note 13. The typology has been adopted by and 
elaborated more recently in NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., ENG’G, & 
MED., supra note 13, at 22–32.  
21. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 13, at 25.
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while other rules obligate their targets to achieve (or avoid) particular 
ends or end-states—such as ensuring that air pollution emissions do 
not exceed specified levels.  Rules that compel action or the adoption 
of particular means have been referred to by many names, including 
prescriptive or command-and-control rules, but it would be more ac-
curate to say simply that they are means-based.22  By contrast, regula-
tions that impose an output or outcome obligation can be considered 
ends-based, although they often travel under the banner of other 
names, such as performance standards or outcome-based regulation.23 
The second key characteristic centers on the connection between 
a rule’s obligation and the ultimate problem the policymaker seeks to 
solve.24  Some rules focus on that ultimate problem—taking what can 
be considered a macro orientation to the overall objective.  Other rules 
focus on a subsidiary objective or they target a micro step along the 
causal chain that leads to the ultimate problem or its avoidance. For 
example, a safety regulator with the ultimate goal of avoiding work-
place injuries can impose a micro rule that requires the use of protec-
tive equipment or a macro rule that imposes liability on employers for 
any workplace injuries that occur.  
Taken individually, any legal obligation can be classified into one 
of four types depending on whether the obligation is defined in 
terms of means or ends, as well as whether it is macro or micro in its 
orientation to the ultimate problem.  Table 1 shows how these four 
distinct types are organized based on these two characteristics.25  
Table 1: Regulatory Types Based on Key Characteristics 
22. Coglianese, supra note 13, at 162–63.
23. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 13, at 27, 30.
24. Id. at 25–26.
25. It is possible, of course, for a regulator to adopt more than one type of legal obligation
or rule at the same time in combination. This bundling is common. See id. at 23, 89. 
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For example, the imposition of liability for harms caused by pol-
lution emissions, as seen in traditional nuisance law, is an example of 
a macro-ends regulation because the focus is placed on the problem—
namely, harms created by pollution—and the legal obligation to pay 
damages is triggered by the occurrence of that problem.26  By contrast, 
a specified limit on emissions from a smokestack would be an example 
of a micro-ends regulation because the emissions are not themselves 
the ultimate problem (especially if no one is around to breathe them), 
but they are instead a key step on the causal chain toward creating neg-
ative health effects or other harms the policymaker seeks to reduce. 
A requirement that a factory install pollution control equipment 
is also micro in its orientation, because the equipment requirement fo-
cuses on one step on a causal chain in an industrial process that leads 
to emissions, which in turn leads to the ultimate health effects or other 
harms the policymaker seeks to reduce.  Such an obligation to install 
equipment, however, is a type of means-based regulation because it 
mandates the adoption of a particular type of means. Specifically, it is 
a micro-means regulation.  
But a regulation can require specific means while still being 
macro in its orientation.  This is the case with what has come to be 
known as management-based regulation—a common name for macro-
means regulation.27  Under macro-means regulation, the legal obliga-
tion focuses on the ultimate problem; it does so by requiring the regu-
lated entity to identify that problem, analyze how the entity’s activity 
might be contributing to it, and develop objectives and strategies for 
addressing it.  Such policies are generally characterized as “manage-
ment-based” because the required means are all managerial in orienta-
tion, directing firms’ managers to conduct analyses, set goals, create 
plans, and engage in efforts to implement those strategies, and often 
also to assess and revise them on a regular basis. 
B. Domestic Applications of Management-Based Regulation
Two specific applications illustrate the design of management-
based regulation.  The first example comes from food safety regula-
tion, where regulators around the world have required food processors 
26. For general background on nuisance law, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821A
(1979). 
27. See NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 13, at 30 (macro-means regula-
tion); Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 11 (management-based regulation). This regulatory de-
sign has less commonly been called “enforced self-regulation.” John Braithwaite, Enforced 
Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1982). 
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to follow a management model known as HACCP, which stands for 
“hazard analysis and critical control points.”28  HACCP adopts a sys-
tematic risk management approach to foodborne illnesses caused by 
contamination of food with microscopic pathogens, a serious problem 
that afflicts millions of people each year.29  HACCP regulations man-
date management efforts to focus on this problem, requiring food pro-
cessing facilities and restaurants to identify possible points of contam-
ination and develop internal plans and procedures for preventing such 
contamination from occurring.30 Although specific HACCP regula-
tions can vary, in general they require food processors and restaurants 
to complete seven management actions: (1) conduct a hazards analysis 
of their facility to identify where contamination can occur; (2) identify 
critical control points (CCPs) in their food production or preparation 
processes; (3) set goals or restrictions for each CCP, such as tempera-
tures or sampling limits; (4) monitor each CCP against those stated 
goals; (5) pursue corrective actions for any CCP that fails to meet 
stated goals; (6) perform regular reassessment of CCPs and food safety 
goals, adjusting them as needed to maintain continuous improvement; 
and (7) maintain records documenting the above actions.31   
A second example of macro-means or management-based regula-
tion comes from environmental law.  More than a dozen states have 
adopted pollution prevention planning laws.32  These laws treat the ex-
cessive use of toxic chemicals in industrial activities as a problem, and 
they seek to focus industrial facility managers’ attention on reducing 
that use.  Unlike micro-means regulation, these laws do not mandate 
exactly how facilities should reduce their use of toxics and, in contrast 
with ends-based regulation, they do not even mandate any reductions 
28. See SARA MORTIMORE & CAROL WALLACE, HACCP: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 1 (3d
ed. 2013). 
29. See CDC Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/pdfs/factsheet 
_a_findings_updated4-13.pdf. 
30. See, e.g., Pathogen Reduction: Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806 (July 25, 1996) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 304, 308, 310, 
320, 327, 381, 416, & 417). 
31. For discussions of HACCP’s general approach, see Coglianese & Lazer, supra note
11, at 697–98; Caroline Smith DeWaal, Delivering on HACCP’s Promise to Improve Food 
Safety: A Comparison of Three HACCP Regulations, 52 FOOD DRUG L.J. 331 (1997); Peter J. 
May, Regulatory Regimes and Accountability, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 8, 14–17 (2007). 
32. See Lori S. Bennear, Evaluating Management-Based Regulation: A Valuable Tool in
the Regulatory Tool Box?, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED 
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 51, 52 (Cary Coglianese & Jen-
nifer Nash eds., 2006). 
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in toxics usage.33  Rather, they impose mandatory management actions 
that are intended to force facility managers to think about their use of 
toxics and to find ways to reduce them.  
The specifics of these laws can vary, but they typically share the 
same basic elements as found in the Massachusetts Toxic Use Reduc-
tion Act (TURA)—the first such state law of this kind.34  Under 
TURA, regulated firms must engage in an internal analysis of their 
current use of toxic chemicals, develop goals for reducing those toxics, 
establish internal plans for meeting their reduction goals, and submit 
to the government annual reports and other documentation on their fa-
cilities’ use and release of toxic chemicals.35  Although some state laws 
mandate that facilities actually follow through on their 
plans, most follow Massachusetts’s TURA and merely require goal-
setting and internal planning—not the implementation of plans or the 
attainment of goals.36     
With these examples in mind, it should be clear that management-
based or macro-means regulation compels managers of regulated enti-
ties to focus attention on an underlying regulatory problem and then 
requires them to analyze how their operations are contributing to that 
problem, to set goals for reducing or mitigating the problem, and to 
establish plans for attaining those goals.  This type of regulation re-
quires that firms adopt a systematic process of management that usu-
ally tracks what has come to be known widely as a “plan-do-check-
act” process, a management method used often in the business world 
to promote quality improvements in products or processes.37  The plan-
do-check-act process calls for managers to engage in an ongoing cycle 
of planning, operating, monitoring, and re-evaluating—all with the 
aim of achieving continuous improvement.38  By requiring regulated 
entities to follow such a systematic management method, manage-
ment-based regulations such as HACCP and TURA aim to prompt 
companies to commit to addressing problems and to following docu-
mented processes intended to keep them on a path toward ever-increas-
ing improvements.  
33. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note  11, at 709.
34. See Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REG. 146 (Martin Cave et al., eds., 2010). 
35. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21I, §§ 1–23 (2002).
36. See Coglianese & Mendelson, supra note 34.
37. See Coglianese, supra note 17, at 55–60.
38. See Cary Coglianese & Shana Starobin, Management-Based Regulation, in POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Kenneth R. Richards and Josephine van Zeben, eds.,
forthcoming). 
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C. The Paris Agreement as Management-Based
Global Governance
The management-based approach to domestic regulation effec-
tively describes the core requirements that lie at the heart of the Paris 
Agreement.39  Unlike the structured ends-based requirements embed-
ded in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,40 which contained a schedule of des-
ignated reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from developed coun-
tries,41 the Paris Agreement imposes no such requirements for attaining 
any particular emissions reductions.42  Nor does it require that coun-
tries adopt or abandon any specific sources of energy.  It is true, of 
course, that countries that signed the Paris Agreement agree to the im-
portance of the overarching goal of limiting the increase of the global 
mean temperature to two degrees Celsius,43 but that target is not a bind-
ing obligation on any individual country.  Instead, the signatory nations 
are each required to establish their own climate goals and submit their 
own mitigation plans.44  These nationally determined contributions 
constitute the individual countries’ goals, with the Agreement calling 
on countries to then “pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the 
aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.”45  
The Agreement directs countries to follow transparency guide-
lines for documenting their stated contributions and their progress in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.46  Countries are to report “regu-
larly” on their progress, with these reports subject to a “technical ex-
pert review” that is supposed to help “identify areas of improve-
ment” for each country.47  Starting in 2023 and every fifth year thereafter, 
39. See, e.g., Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions/ndc-regis 
try (noting that “[n]ationally determined contributions (NDCs) are at the heart of the Paris 
Agreement”). 
40. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2.
41. See Weil, supra note 7, at 925.
42. Ahmad et al., supra note 10 at 283.
43. Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.1(a).
44. The agreement has some other requirements too, such as Article 9’s unspecified re-
quirement that developed nations “provide financial resources” to developing nations, but the 
core of the Agreement centers on each country’s setting of its own goals and plans. Id. art. 9.1. 
45. Id. art. 4.2.
46. Id. arts. 4.8, 4.12–13, 13. At the 24th Conference of the Parties in Poland in 2018,
countries adopted a specific and broadly uniform set of guidelines to use in reporting goals 
and progress. See Outcomes of the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Katowice, CTR. FOR
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Dec. 2018), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/ 
2018/12/cop-24-katowice-summary.pdf. 
47. Paris Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 13.7, 13.11–12.
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countries will participate in a “global stocktake” process that will aim 
to foster continuous improvement, as countries are encouraged to “up-
dat[e]” and “enhanc[e]” their nationally determined contributions.48  
If the word “facilities” were substituted for “countries” or “par-
ties” in the Paris Agreement, its provisions would sound like a classic 
case of management-based regulation at the level of domestic law.49 
Indeed, legal and policy analysts have widely characterized the Paris 
Agreement as adopting a “bottom-up” approach50—a term that could 
be applied equally well to management-based regulation, which has 
itself been sometimes been described as “mandated self-regulation”51 
or as “regulating from the inside.”52  As with management-based reg-
ulation, the Paris Agreement calls on each country to identify its 
sources of the causes of the climate problem, set goals for ameliorating 
that problem, and adopt plans to attain those nationally determined 
goals.53  Just as domestic forms of management-based regulation re-
quire that industrial facilities undertake a series of comprehensive 
management steps, the Paris Agreement requires that countries engage 
in a systematic “management” process with respect to greenhouse gas 
emissions: they must set goals, establish plans, monitor and document 
progress, and periodically update their self-regulatory commitments.54  
As with TURA and other domestic forms of management-based regu-
lation, the Paris Agreement does not impose any legal consequences 
on a country that fails to establish ambitious goals in the first instance 
nor on one that fails to meet whatever goals or plans the country does 
establish for itself.55  The obligation is simply to follow what is, at a 
national policy level, a management process.     
48. Id. art. 14.
49. See Cary Coglianese, When Management-Based Regulation Goes Global, REG. REV.
(Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.theregreview.org/2015/12/23/coglianese-when-management-
based-regulation-goes-global/; see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 11. 
50. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?,
110 AM. J. INTL. L. 288 (2016); Meinhard Doelle, The Paris Agreement: Historic Break-
through or High Stakes Experiment?, 6 CLIMATE L. 1 (2016). 
51. See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982). 
52. See Cary Coglianese, Policies to Promote Systematic Environmental Management,
in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE 
POLICY GOALS? 181 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds. 2001). 
53. See Ahmad et al., supra note 10, at 284.
54. Id.
55. See Robert Falkner, The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate
Politics, 92 INTL. AFF. 1107, 1117–18 (2016). 
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II. THE ROLE AND LIMITS OF MANAGEMENT-BASED GOVERNANCE
Resting the fate of the planet on a legal regime that requires coun-
tries to engage in a policy management process but never compels 
them to achieve any reductions in greenhouse gases, may seem unset-
tling, if not even somewhat absurd.  But a rationale for management-
based regulation exists, and both theory and evidence suggest that it 
can prove effective in addressing domestic regulatory problems (at 
least under certain conditions).56  To gauge better what the Paris 
Agreement can realistically be expected to achieve at the international 
level, it can help to consider evidence about management-based regu-
lation in domestic settings and how the theory and evidence gained 
elsewhere might apply to the problem of global climate change. 
A. Conditions for Taking a Management-Based Approach
One reason for using management-based regulation is to address
problems that stem from poor or inadequate management.  For exam-
ple, some industrial and transportation accidents occur because insuf-
ficient coordination of connected behaviors and technologies can lead 
to breakdowns in systems operations, producing catastrophic results.57 
For example, when the BP Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded in 
the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, leading to the most extensive oil 
spill in U.S. history, the presidential commission that investigated the 
accident pointed to “systematic failures in risk management:”58  
The well blew out because a number of separate risk 
factors, oversights, and outright mistakes combined to 
overwhelm the safeguards meant to prevent just such 
an event from happening.  But most of the mistakes and 
oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single 
overarching failure—a failure of management.59 
Management failures like these become regulatory problems when the 
harms from such failures spill over to third parties—that is, when they 
create negative externalities.60  In these cases, managers of risky 
56. For a discussion of the evidence on management-based regulation’s effectiveness,
see Coglianese & Starobin, supra note 38. 
57. See generally CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK
TECHNOLOGIES (1999). 
58. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
Report to the President, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drill-
ing, GPO, vii (Jan. 2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMIS 
SION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf. 
59. Id. at 90.
60. For a discussion of negative externalities, see THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGU-
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industrial or transportation companies lack adequate incentives to in-
vest in the socially optimal level of management rigor or diligence.  In 
other words, for the same reasons that firms sometimes lack incentives 
to make socially optimal investments in safety or pollution control 
equipment, they can also lack the proper incentives to invest ade-
quately in management practices.61  
But recognizing that poor management can lead to problems does 
not necessarily imply that management-based regulation is the answer. 
After all, other regulatory strategies may work just as effectively, if not 
better.  For example, policymakers can impose ex post liability (macro-
ends regulation) on businesses for harms created by accidents, thus 
providing an incentive for more diligent management.  Or if diligent 
management would lead businesses to install certain safety devices at 
their facilities, regulators could directly mandate the installation of 
those devices.  Any decision to select management-based regulation 
should be made on the basis of a comparison with other regulatory al-
ternatives, namely the other designs discussed in Part I.A.  The relative 
advantages and disadvantages of different regulatory designs should 
be assessed in each particular regulatory context, as they will likely 
depend on the nature of the problem to be solved, the incentives and 
capacities of the regulated entities, and the regulator’s capabilities.  
Still, it is possible to suggest some generalizations.62  We should 
not, for example, overstate the role that ex post liability can play. After 
all, such liability already exists as a background norm in domestic tort 
law, but the emergence of modern regulations around the world reveals 
the insufficiency of such liability on its own.  When it comes to the 
prevention of low-probability, high-consequence events, ex post lia-
bility usually cannot create sufficient incentives because the conse-
quences of liability can be softened through insurance or bankruptcy 
and because firms’ managers have cognitive biases (as we all do) that 
lead to systematic underappreciation of risk.63  Moreover, ex post lia-
bility is only triggered when a catastrophe occurs, while the public rea-
sonably expects policies to impose ex ante obligations in the hope of 
preventing catastrophes from occurring in the first place.   
LATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 23-29 (2017). 
61. For a discussion of market failures that justify regulation, see generally W. KIP
VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 2–3 (2d ed. 1995). 
62. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 11.
63. For an excellent overview of cognitive biases and their implications for managers,
see generally ROBERT MEYER & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, THE OSTRICH PARADOX: WHY WE 
UNDERPREPARE FOR DISASTERS (2017). 
2019] PLEDGING, POPULISM, AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT 153 
Micro-means regulations have thus been widely adopted because, 
at least when used for well-understood problems that have common 
one-size-fits-all solutions, they can offer considerable certainty in their 
effectiveness and they tend to be easier for regulators to monitor for 
compliance.64  For example, presumably any mission-critical equip-
ment in an industrial operation will need a backup source of energy in 
case of a power outage, so it makes sense to mandate that firms install 
backup generators.  Similarly, because any building needs a fire alarm 
to alert occupants to leave in the event of a fire, building codes require 
the installation of smoke detectors and similar alarm systems.  An ad-
vantage of micro-means regulation is that it can be relatively easy for 
regulatory inspectors to ensure that such mandated, one-size-fits-all 
means have been installed.  
Of course, one size does not always fit all.  In such circumstances, 
a micro-ends or performance-based regulation will make sense be-
cause it gives regulated entities flexibility to find their own lowest-cost 
way to achieve the required outcome.65  For example, car manufactur-
ers have many different ways to construct their cars to protect occu-
pants in the event of a crash, and, as a result, automobile safety regu-
lations obligate manufacturers to meet a performance test conducted 
under laboratory conditions with crash test dummies connected to 
pressure sensors.66  Such a performance-based approach to regulation 
has been widely hailed for its ability to accommodate different prod-
ucts or operations as well as to allow room for innovation over time.67 
But micro-ends regulation will only work well when desired regulatory 
outcomes can be reliably observed and monitored.68  
Yet, just as one size does not always fit all, it will not always be 
the case that outcomes can be measured easily enough to justify the 
use of a micro-ends regulatory design.  If outcomes cannot be reliably 
monitored and one size does not fit all, then what is a regulator to do? 
That is a time when the regulator can turn to macro-means or manage-
ment-based regulation, because this approach only imposes require-
ments for documented management steps, giving regulated entities’ 
64. See NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 13, at 31.
65. Id.
66. 58 Fed. Reg. 46551 (Sept. 2, 1993); see generally Cary Coglianese, The Limits of
Performance-Based Regulation, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 525, 533 (2017). 
67. See id. at 525-28.
68. See Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash & Todd Olmstead, Performance-Based Regula-
tion: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 705 (2003).
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flexibility over the direct, substantive actions they choose to take.69 
The conditions for using management-based regulation can thus be 
summarized as: (1) a high degree of heterogeneity in regulated targets 
and their operations, and (2) considerable difficulty in reliably moni-
toring desired end states.70  
Turning to the problem of global climate change, then, it is clear 
that greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation impose negative ex-
ternalities that can justify regulation of some kind.71  The question be-
comes what kind of regulatory design would work best. Management-
based regulation fits the problem of climate change well because the 
two conditions for its use are easily met in this context.72 
The first condition for management-based regulation—heteroge-
neity among regulated entities—applies quite strongly in the context 
of climate change.  No one-size-fits-all solution could be mandated 
because of the extensive diversity that exists across countries’ current 
energy sources, natural resource uses, and economic conditions.  Not 
only are there broad differences between developed and developing 
economies, but, as the Paris Agreement itself recognizes, “different 
national circumstances” exist even within these categories.73  The 
Agreement calls for each country’s nationally determined contribution 
to be customized to fit its particular circumstances.74   
As to the second condition, reliable monitoring of greenhouse gas 
emissions is far from a straightforward task, both nationally and on a 
global scale.  Emissions stem from many millions of different indus-
trial and transportation-related sources, and the concentration of green-
house gasses in the stratosphere can be affected by other factors such 
69. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 11, at 705-06.
70. Id.; Coglianese, supra note 13, at 167-68.
71. Global climate change is a commons or public good problem, a special case of an
externality or harm to third parties. Reductions in globally mixed pollutants are nonexcludable 
and nonrivalrous, which means that each polluter (and each country) has an incentive to free 
ride on others’ mitigation efforts. 
72. This is not to say that other factors, such as practicality and political economy, did
not also reinforce, if not even drive, the adoption of a management-based approach for the 
Paris Agreement, as a positive matter. Here I am focusing on prescriptive conditions from the 
standpoint of the theory of regulatory instrument choice. 
73. See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, preamble & arts. 2.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.19. The Agree-
ment also refers in multiple parts to nations’ “common but differentiated responsibilities.” Id. 
at preamble & arts. 2.2, 4.3, 4.19. 
74. Id. art. 4.3 (stating that a country’s nationally determined contribution should “reflect
its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and re-
spective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances”). 
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as deforestation.75  Each country faces its own challenges in accurately 
measuring emissions and other climate-related activities within its bor-
ders.76  A global regime needs accurate techniques to verify each coun-
try’s self-reports.  Not long ago, a National Academy of Sciences study 
committee found such verification methods to be “not sufficiently ac-
curate.”77  More recently, satellite and aircraft monitoring techniques 
have emerged that hold promise, especially for tracking carbon emis-
sions.78  But reliably tracking and verifying countries’ outputs is still 
far from simple and assured.  It is thus not surprising that the Paris 
Agreement itself repeatedly emphasizes the need for transparency,79 
nor that a subsequent global climate agreement forged in Katowice, 
Poland in 2018 devoted a noteworthy level of attention to issues of 
monitoring and verification.80  
75. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 4-6, 28 (2014). For further discussion of deforestation and climate 
change, see, e.g., Richard A. Houghton, Tropical Deforestation as a Source of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Paul Moutinho & 
Stephan Schwartzman, eds. 2005). 
76. In 2016, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported that it had pre-
viously underestimated methane emissions in the United States. See Chris Mooney, The U.S. 
Has Been Emitting a Lot More Methane Than We Thought, Says EPA, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/04/15/epa-is-
sues-large-upward-revision-to-u-s-methane-emissions. Subsequent research continues to sug-
gest that previous estimates of methane emissions have been too low. See Ramón A. Alvarez 
et al., Assessment of Methane Emissions from the U.S. Oil and Gas Supply Chain, 361 SCI. 
186 (2018); Xinrong Ren et al., Methane Emissions from the Baltimore-Washington Area 
Based on Airborne Observations: Comparison to Emissions Inventories, 123 J. GEO. RES. 
ATMOS. 8869 (2018). 
77. Verifying Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Methods to Support International Climate
Agreements, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED. 1 (2010). 
78. NASA has developed a U.S. satellite monitoring system for carbon emissions. Orbit-
ing Carbon Observatory 2, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/oco2/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2019). Recently, its funding has been targeted by the Trump Administra-
tion. See Paul Voosen, Trump White House Quietly Cancels NASA Research Verifying Green-
house Gas Cuts, SCI. MAG. (May 9, 2018), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/05/trump-
white-house-quietly-cancels-nasa-research-verifying-greenhouse-gas-cuts. But the technol-
ogy could be useful in verifying emissions from individual industrial facilities. See Ray Nassar 
et al., Quantifying CO2 Emissions from Individual Power Plants from Space, 44 GEOPHYSICAL 
RES. LETTERS 10,045 (2017). Additional private efforts have reportedly shown an ability to 
verify methane emissions by combining satellite and airplane monitoring. See Shale Gas, 
GHG SAT. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.ghgsat.com/case-studies/case-study-shale-gas. 
79. See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.8, 4.13, 6.2, 13.1.
80. See, e.g., Katowice Climate Change Conference, The Katowice Texts: Proposal by
the President, Annex I & II (Dec. 14, 2018) https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Ka-
towice%20text%2C%2014%20Dec2018_1015AM.pdf (detailing methods intended to “facil-
itate clarity, transparency and understanding of nationally determined contributions”). 
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B. The Effectiveness of Management-Based Governance
The existence of the two conditions for management-based regu-
lation—heterogeneity and difficulty in monitoring performance—
helps to explain why countries opted for a management-based ap-
proach in the Paris Agreement.81  However, the mere fact that global 
climate change satisfies the theoretical conditions underpinning man-
agement-based regulation does not provide any guarantee that this le-
gal approach will in fact prove successful.  After all, the two conditions 
that theory suggests will make management-based regulation appro-
priate amount to little more than the very conditions under which both 
traditional means- and ends-based regulatory strategies will fail.82  Is 
there any reason to think that management-based regulation can suc-
ceed under these conditions? 
Perhaps surprisingly, sound empirical evidence indicates that 
management-based regulation can deliver meaningful substantive re-
sults.  This evidence comes from the application of management-based 
regulation to address the two types of domestic regulatory problems 
discussed in the previous Part: foodborne illnesses and the use of toxic 
chemicals. 
With respect to foodborne illnesses, following the imposition of 
HACCP requirements on meat processing plants, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture found that the incidence of salmonella on sampled meat 
products declined between 10-60%, depending on the type of meat.83 
Overall, the Centers for Disease Control reported a 23% decline in 
foodborne illnesses in the initial years following the imposition of 
these management-based food safety requirements.84  Although such 
data suggests a positive effect from the imposition of HACCP’s man-
agement-based regulatory approach, by themselves they cannot rule 
out the possibility that such declines would have occurred anyway.  To 
have confidence that HACCP led to a reduction in foodborne illnesses, 
researchers must compare the observed decline in foodborne illnesses 
with an estimate of the counterfactual—that is, the rate of such ill-
nesses in the absence of the regulation.  A statistical strategy known as 
differences-in-differences estimation provides the basis for estimating 
81. Of course, for the purpose of forging a widespread agreement, the management-based
approach also has much to offer in terms of political feasibility because it lacks substantive 
legal obligations and affords each country flexibility in choosing its own performance goals 
and energy mix, providing for greater maneuverability. See Falkner, supra note 55; see also 
Biniaz, supra note 16. 
82. Coglianese, supra note 13, at 169.
83. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 11, at 724.
84. Id.
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how much any decline in foodborne illnesses can be attributed to a 
HACCP regulation.85  Economists Travis Minor and Matt Parrett used 
this strategy to study the impact of the U.S. Food and Drug Admin-
istration’s (FDA) HACCP regulation of fruit juice manufacturers.86 
They compared the change in foodborne illnesses associated with 
juices after the introduction of HACCP to the change over the same 
time period in foodborne illnesses associated with all other types of 
food products, which were not subject to HACCP, finding that the 
FDA’s HACCP regulation was associated with an annual reduction of 
about 500 juice-related foodborne illnesses.87  This was a substantial 
reduction given that the total annual foodborne illnesses from juices 
ranged from about 600 to 1,800 in the period prior to the adoption of 
the HACCP regulation.88  
Similarly, states’ experiences with management-based pollution 
prevention regulations shows that management-based regulation can 
produce positive results.  Legal scholars Michael Dorf and Charles Sa-
bel have argued that “[s]ubstantial evidence in the aggregate and at the 
firm level suggests that this apparatus works” in reducing toxic pollu-
tion.89  Policy analyst Thomas Beierle has claimed that the Massachu-
setts Toxic Use Reduction Act specifically has “been quite effective in 
reducing toxic releases and waste,” because that state “outpaced the 
nation as a whole in reducing on-site [toxic] releases.”90  However, 
Beierle does not note that all New England states—even those without 
management-based toxic chemical laws—experienced declines in 
toxic pollution that outpaced the rest of the nation.91  More sophisti-
cated analysis is thus needed to have confidence that management-
based regulation made a difference. Economist Lori Bennear has pro-
vided just such analysis in her longitudinal study of toxic pollution at 
85. For a more detailed discussion of the difference-in-differences estimation strategy,
see Lori Snyder Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Measuring Progress: Program Evaluation of 
Environmental Policies, 47 ENV’T. 22 (2005). 
86. Travis Minor & Matt Parrett, The Economic Impact of the Food and Drug Admin-
istration’s Final Juice HACCP Rule, 68 FOOD POL’Y 206 (2017). 
87. Id. at 210–11 (“We find evidence that the FDA’s Final Juice Rule reduced the number
of foodborne illnesses associated with juice-bearing products by between 462 and 508 annu-
ally.”). 
88. Id. at 208 & fig.1.
89. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 382 (1998). 
90. Thomas C. Beierle, Environmental Information Disclosure: Three Cases of Policy
and Politics 30 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-16, 2003), https://agecon-
search.umn.edu/bitstream/10527/1/dp030016.pdf. 
91. Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, The Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act:
Design and Implementation of a Management-Based Environmental Regulation (2004) (un-
published manuscript). 
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more than 31,000 industrial facilities throughout the United States in 
the 1990s.92  Using the same kind of differences-in-differences analy-
sis that Minor and Parrett performed on HACCP, Bennear has deter-
mined that facilities in states with management-based pollution pre-
vention laws achieved on average 28-30% greater declines in their 
reported levels of toxic emissions.93   
These improvements are striking, especially given that neither 
HACCP nor pollution prevention planning laws actually require a re-
duction in the targeted problems.  How can regulations that merely re-
quire businesses to engage in a management activity nevertheless lead 
to significant substantive results?  Three complementary reasons can 
be offered to explain why management-based regulation can work. 
First, management-based regulation may succeed because, as 
noted earlier, some problems might simply stem from lack of proper 
management.94  The poor coordination of people and processes that 
make up a complex industrial operation will lead to accidents or con-
tamination when people get in each other’s way or fail to sequence 
their actions properly.95  Making firms engage in management activi-
ties can help improve their internal coordination and promote safer out-
comes. 
Second, management-based regulation may work because of how 
it interacts with other regulatory tools, such as macro-ends liability.96 
If businesses know they will be liable if they find problems with their 
operations but fail to fix them, then once firms are forced to find these 
problems through management-based regulation they will be inclined 
to correct them, even if doing so is costly.97 
92. Lori Snyder Bennear, Are Management-Based Regulations Effective? Evidence from
State Pollution Prevention Programs, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 327, 328 (2007). 
93. Id. at 345.
94. See Coglianese, supra note 13, at 172-73; see also supra notes 57-59 and accompa-
nying text. 
95. See NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 13, at 93-94 (noting that man-
agement-based regulation has been used to respond to “safety problems [that] are more diffi-
cult to disaggregate into contributing factors” and where “risks arise from the interaction of 
many facility- and operations-specific factors”). 
96. See Coglianese, supra note 13, at 173.
97. On the other hand, the threat of liability might affect how diligently firms engage in
required management actions. As a committee of the National Academies of Sciences, Engi-
neering, and Medicine has noted, “the background threat of liability in the event of a catastro-
phe may motivate a firm to plan more carefully, but the possibility of a firm’s internal plans 
being used against it in a subsequent action for liability could have the opposite effect of caus-
ing the firm to plan less ambitiously.” NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 13, at 
138-39.
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Finally, firms may well reap their own private rewards by taking 
the actions that they take in response to a management-based regula-
tion.98  The required management activity can directly deliver private 
benefits if its resulting improvements in internal coordination not only 
make industrial operations safer or cleaner but also make them more 
efficient or productive.  Required management efforts can also indi-
rectly lead a business to discover some non-management actions, such 
as the installation of safety devices or changes to internal work prac-
tices, that deliver both public and private benefits. Of course, one 
might ask why any company that would reap its own rewards would 
not have already undertaken activity to bring about such rewards.  In 
some cases, it will simply be too costly for businesses to find these 
private rewards absent any management-based regulations; they will 
not know these opportunities are there until they look for them, and 
they do not look for them because the search process has its own 
costs.99  But once a management-based regulation requires businesses 
to engage in a systematic analysis of their operations and create a plan 
of action, they will have been forced to incur the costs of searching for 
and finding these otherwise privately rewarding opportunities.100  
In the context of global climate change, it may be hard to see the 
first two explanations for management-based regulation—that is, the 
imperatives of operational management and the threat of ex post lia-
bility—applying to nation-states.101  But the third reason—that is, the 
finding of joint gains from taking the required management steps— 
would surely apply to climate change.  That third reason would apply 
to the Paris Agreement if, by requiring countries to make and then 
98. This is the circumstance that Lori Bennear has called a “strong complementarity”
between management efforts and private gains.  Bennear, supra note 32, at 59 (noting that 
management-based environmental regulations can work when there is “a strong positive rela-
tionship between increasing pollution-prevention [management] effort and increasing cost-
savings or benefits from pollution reductions”). 
99. See Coglianese, supra note 13, at 172 (“Since finding cost savings and competitive
advantages from socially responsible behavior is costly, rational firms will only expend the 
necessary search costs when the expected net benefits exceed the search costs.”). 
100. See id. (discussing how, “when a management-based regulation mandates firms to
engage in planning and analysis, firms must engage in search costs [which] become sunk costs 
to the firm, and any cost-saving or profit-enhancing actions firms identify along the way of 
complying with management-based regulation will be adopted…”). 
101. As to the first reason, nation-states do have complex industries operating within their
jurisdictions, to be sure, but the state is not itself the kind of entity like a complex industrial 
operation that could benefit from careful management. Furthermore, the problem of climate 
change does not stem from inadequate management but from the misalignment of incentives 
inherent in any public good scenario.  As to the second reason, nation-states are not subject to 
a threat of background liability or regulatory compliance risk that would work synergistically 
with a management-based treaty addressing climate change. 
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update nationally determined commitments, the Agreement forces 
countries to invest in search processes that both yield reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions as well as reap other gains for each coun-
try.102  Such emissions reductions will usually generate substantial co-
benefits, that is, reductions in locally harmful effects of pollution at the 
same time that they reduce global climate risks.103 Raising fuel econ-
omy standards for automobiles, for example, may be sufficiently jus-
tified merely due to the domestic cost savings from fuel consumption 
and reductions in local pollutants, even though such tightened stand-
ards will also produce global benefits from the reductions in green-
house gas emissions.  In this way, adopting measures to reduce green-
house gas emissions could thus help save the planet at the same time 
that they potentially save thousands or millions of lives in each country 
simply by cleaning the local air.104  The Paris Agreement’s manage-
ment-based approach may help motivate national leaders to find and 
adopt a range of policies that deliver sufficiently positive net domestic 
benefits and that also deliver the added bonus of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions.105  
102. Article 2, for example, situates the Agreement’s climate objectives “in the context of
sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.” Paris Agreement, supra note 1,  art. 
2.1.  In addition, Article 9’s provision related to funding suggests that, for developing coun-
tries, some “other gains” contemplated under the Agreement would have stemmed from finan-
cial assistance provided by developed countries to assist with the former countries’ mitigation 
and adaptation efforts. Id. art. 9. But Article 9 does not provide any specific amount of, or 
formula for, financial support that developed countries are supposed to provide. The Agree-
ment has been described as “deliberately vague” and ineffectual on the matter of developed 
countries’ financial assistance. Andrea N. Kienast, Consensus Behind Action: The Fate of the 
Paris Agreement in the United States of America, 9 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 314, 325-26 
(2015). Overall, the Agreement “does little to ensure adequate financing in the future.” Mar-
garetha Wewerinke-Singh & Curtis Doebbler, The Paris Agreement: Some Critical Reflec-
tions on Process and Substance, 39 U.N.S.W.L.J. 1486, 1507-08 (2016). 
103. For a discussion of co-benefits (or ancillary benefits), see Dallas Burtraw & Michael
A. Toman, “Ancillary Benefits” of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Policies, MICHAEL A. TOMAN, 
ED., CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS AND POLICY: AN RFF ANTHOLOGY 80 (2001).
104. See COP24 Special Report: Health and Climate Change, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 1,
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/276405/9789241514972-eng.pdf (last vis-
ited May 5, 2019). 
105. Recent debate over whether to count foreign benefits in benefit-cost analysis of do-
mestic environmental regulation makes plain that environmental and energy policies can yield 
local benefits at the same time that they reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g., Ted Gayer 
& W. Kip Viscusi, Determining the Proper Scope of Climate Change Benefits in U.S. Regu-
latory Analyses: Domestic Versus Global Approaches, 10 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 2 
(2016) (raising concerns about the empirical and legal validity of reliance on the foreign ef-
fects of domestic regulations when estimating their benefits and costs); Peter Howard & Jason 
Schwartz, Think Global: International Reciprocity as Justification for a Global Social Cost of 
Carbon, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 203 (2017) (offering a defense of the use of foreign benefits 
in benefit-cost analyses of domestic regulations).   
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C. The Limits of Management-Based Governance
The available evidence showing the efficacy of domestic applica-
tions of management-based regulation would appear to give the world 
reason to expect that the Paris Agreement can achieve reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions on the global stage.106 However, these ex-
pectations should not be set too high.  A management-based approach 
to climate governance might well prompt progress in greenhouse gas 
reductions, but this does not mean it will yield significant or globally 
optimal reductions in emissions. With respect to the goal of limiting 
the rise of the global mean temperature to no more than two degrees 
Celsius, the initial nationally determined contributions offered under 
the framework of the Paris Agreement appear not to be up to the task—
and even these limited commitments might never be achieved.107   
Some might hope that subsequent rounds of commitments will 
yield more substantial pledges over time.  Yet research on domestic 
applications of management-based regulation suggests that such hope 
would be misplaced.  Researchers have come across a number of po-
tentially serious concerns about the limits of management-based regu-
lation, and perhaps the most well-documented one is that the positive 
effects from this form of regulation can be short-lived.108  In her study 
of state pollution prevention planning regulations, for example, Lori 
Bennear tested for the effect of planning requirements on facilities over 
time and found that the statistically significant reductions she observed 
in the data occurred only for up to four years after the imposition of a 
planning law.109  By the fifth year, the results failed to pass the normal 
test for statistical significance—meaning that states with these plan-
ning laws no longer yielded any improvements relative to states with-
out these laws.110 
Management-based regulation of domestic policy problems may 
only prompt initial improvements because it leads private-sector man-
agers to find and pick the low-hanging fruit—solutions that are easy 
and quick fixes.111  These managers may initially find and implement 
a variety of win-win opportunities, where both the private organization 
and the broader public and environment reap rewards.  With the low-
106. See supra notes 83-84, 86-88, 92-93 and accompanying text.
107. See Allen A. Fawcett et al., Can Paris Pledges Avert Severe Climate Change?, 350
SCI. 1168, 1168 (2015). 
108. See Coglianese, supra note 13, at 173.
109. Bennear, supra note 92, at 340.
110. Id. at 341.
111. Coglianese & Nash, supra note 91, at 95-96.
162 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:5 
hanging fruit picked, further reductions in the underlying problem be-
come increasingly costly and thus may no longer provide businesses 
with win-win gains.112 
With the passage of time, businesses may continue to complete 
the required management steps but they may do so with less rigor and 
with dampened commitment to addressing the ultimate problem that 
the regulation aims to solve.113  For example, one study of two Aus-
tralian companies subject to management-based workplace safety rules 
described the “the predominant response of both workers and middle 
management” as simply a matter of “going the through the motions 
without any conviction that this would achieve anything of sub-
stance.”114  Others have observed that compliance with management-
based regulation can amount to little more than “pencil-whipping” as 
required management documentation becomes routinized without 
business managers showing any real ambition to make meaningful im-
provements in actual practices.115  
Regulators can try to counteract these tendencies if they can de-
fine with meaningful precision what counts as high-quality manage-
ment efforts or if they deploy sophisticated inspectors who can help 
motivate continuous improvements.  But if management-based regula-
tion is used in circumstances where outputs are difficult to monitor and 
no clear one-size-fits-all action can be observed, as is presumably the 
case by definition, then this form of regulation faces inherent difficul-
ties in preventing regulated entities from shirking.116  Laggard firms 
may evade detection by merely going through the motions in under-
taking the required management activities.117 
The limitations of management-based regulation in the domestic 
context also apply to its usage in the context of global climate 
change.118  Indeed, they may be even more worrisome when applied to 
112. Economists and other analysts widely assume that there are increasing marginal costs
to environmental control, meaning that it becomes progressively costly to reduce pollution to 
ever-lower levels. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 264 (1982).  In the context 
of climate change, it has also been recognized that “there are a number of opportunities to 
reduce emissions at little or no cost” but that these “are mostly one-time measures that are not 
indefinitely exploitable.” Thomas C. Schelling, What Makes Greenhouse Sense?, 81 FOREIGN 
AFF. 2, 4 (2002). 
113. Coglianese & Nash, supra note 91, at 95-96.
114. Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Organizational Trust and the Limits of Man-
agement-Based Regulation, 43 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 865, 890 (2009). 
115. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 13, at 111.
116. Cf. Coglianese, supra note 17, at 70.
117. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
118. See James K. Hammitt, Is “Practical Global Climate Policy” Sufficient?, in
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global governance.  At least in countries with strong domestic govern-
ing institutions, policymakers can back up any requirements for spec-
ified management action with the threat of imposing sanctions on 
firms; this cannot be said to the same extent for international regulatory 
schemes like the Paris Agreement.119  Moreover, even though the 
Agreement has not yet required very much of countries beyond their 
initial pledges, signs of wavering commitments are already appearing. 
Only the European Union and twenty-five countries have signed onto 
a separate pledge to increase the ambitiousness of their climate goals 
whenever they next update their nationally determined contribu-
tions.120  In addition to President Trump’s announcement of his inten-
tion to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, Brazil 
has reneged on its plan to host the next Conference of the Parties meet-
ing in 2019, and the new Brazilian president has threatened to with-
draw from the Agreement.121  The United States, Kuwait, Russia, and 
Saudia Arabia blocked a provision in the 2018 Katowice Climate Pack-
age—the most recent post-Paris round of international climate negoti-
ations—that would have welcomed a report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change that forecasted a 1.5 degree Celsius global 
mean temperature increase over the course of little more than a dec-
ade.122  All of these signs of wavering commitment have emerged even 
ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-
KYOTO WORLD 324 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007) (noting “difficulties in 
evaluating the efficacy of measures undertaken” as part of a country’s promised contribution 
as well as “the difficulty in even determining the extent to which promised measure were 
seriously attempted”). 
119. Even international agreements that do not rely on a bottom-up, management-based
approach like the Paris Agreement can have weak or nonexistent incentives for compliance. 
For example, the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol, but never ratified it; Canada ratified 
it but later withdrew entirely from the agreement without any apparent consequence of note; 
and supposedly binding targets imposed on Russia under the Protocol were later renegotiated. 
See generally Ian Austen, Canada Announces Exit from Kyoto Climate Treaty, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 12, 2011), at A15; Mustafa H. Babiker et al., The Evolution of a Climate Regme: Kyoto 
to Marrakech and Beyond, 5 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 195 (2002).   
120. See Statement on Stepping up Climate Ambition, HIGH AMBITION COALITION, 1 (Dec.
12, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/news/20181211_statement_en.pdf. The 
absence of other countries on this pledge may seem striking given that the Paris Agreement 
expressly contemplates that nationally determined contributions will become progressively 
more ambitious with each update. Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.3. 
121. See Bruce Douglas, Brazil’s President-Elect Questions Paris Climate Deal Again,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-12/brazil-s-
president-elect-questions-paris-climate-accord-again; see also Ernesto Londono & Lisa Fried-
man, Brazil Backs Out of Hosting the 2019 Climate Change Meeting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/28/world/americas/brazil-climate-meeting.html.  
122. See Kate Sullivan, US Teamed Up with Russia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to Weaken
Language Supporting Landmark Climate Report, CNN (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www. 
cnn.com/2018/12/09/politics/us-climate-change-report/index.html. For the report itself, 
see GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ (last visited May 4, 2019). 
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notwithstanding the very minimal obligations the Paris Agreement has 
imposed to date.123  One can only imagine what this portends for sus-
taining serious widespread commitment in the years to come after the 
low-hanging fruit has been picked. 
III. WEAK PRESSURES AND STRONG POPULISM
The inherent challenges in management-based governance will
only add to another reality confronting the Paris Agreement: its weak 
incentives.  The Agreement is devoid of any meaningful mechanism to 
encourage countries to pursue ambitious climate action, relying instead 
on weak reputational pressures—sometimes captured by the phrase 
“naming and shaming”—to sustain engagement over time.124 The 
basic idea is that the global regime will prompt national climate action 
through a type of peer pressure that generates normative expectations 
for compliance and continued improvement.125  The Paris Agreement’s 
provisions calling for transparency, periodic stocktakes, and ongoing 
reviews stem from an assumption that countries themselves can hold 
each other accountable, with transnational nongovernmental organiza-
tions providing additional pressures for compliance.126  
The Paris Agreement is certainly not alone among international 
agreements in relying on transparency mechanisms designed to sup-
port global peer pressure.  International law lacks the type of sanctions 
that stand behind domestic laws, which means that it often must de-
pend on peer pressure as a principal incentive for compliance.127  Such 
incentives do shape state behavior, especially when transnational 
norms are firmly reinforced by powerful nations on the international 
stage.128  Yet the Paris Agreement’s management-based global regime 
123. See infra Part II.C.
124. See Falkner, supra note 55; Jacquet & Jamieson, supra note 19, at 645.
125. Ahmad et al., supra note 10, at 284.
126. See, e.g., Falkner, supra note 55, at 1121‒22 (describing transparency as “the central
tool for driving up ambition within the [global climate] regime”); Ahmad et al., supra note 10, 
at 284 (“Rather than rely on punitive legal enforcement measures, the Paris Agreement pro-
vides a framework that creates a continuous cycle to take advantage of peer and public pressure 
to motivate countries to raise their ambition over time through several linked processes.”). 
127. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 11, at 3, 32-33 (noting that “sanctioning
authority is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective 
when used” but nevertheless there are reasons to assume that nations have a “propensity to 
comply” with international norms). 
128. See generally Robert O. Keohane et al., The Effectiveness of International Environ-
mental Institutions, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 3 (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993); Beth Simmons & Judith 
Kelley, Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations, 59 
AMER. J. POL. SCI. 55 (2015). 
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complicates efforts at fostering robust global peer pressure.  The 
Agreement provides no clear benchmark for any country to strive to 
achieve; each country’s goal is left for that country to determine for 
itself.129  For this reason, the Paris Agreement is different than treaties 
that merely rely on peer pressure to induce compliance.  Other treaties 
contain a commonly accepted international norm against which com-
pliance can at least be assessed.  By contrast, the Paris Agreement’s 
management-based approach offers no clear, commonly accepted 
norm with respect to the amount of emissions reductions that any na-
tion should achieve, nor even whether countries necessarily have an 
obligation to achieve those commitments.130 
The Paris Agreement in this sense proves even weaker in its pres-
sures for environmental change than the typical international agree-
ment—and that means that, even more than usual with international 
law, domestic rather than transnational political factors will matter for 
motivating climate action.  In finding the political will to impose cli-
mate taxes or commit to adopting costly energy regulations, national 
leaders cannot be expected to respond to reputational sanctions from 
other nations or transnational nongovernmental organizations nearly 
as much as to the interests and values of key elites, interest groups, and 
voting segments in their national polity.131  The Agreement’s manage-
ment-based nature all but assures that domestic pressures will domi-
nate.  Paradoxically, the success of the global climate law will rest ul-
timately with domestic politics.  
Given the primacy of domestic politics, I draw attention in this 
final Part of this Article to three areas of research related to policy and 
politics at the domestic level that offer a window into significant chal-
lenges confronting the Paris Agreement.  First, I discuss research on 
domestic voluntary environmental programs because these programs, 
like the Paris Agreement, rely mainly on reputational incentives.  Sec-
ond, broader sociological research offers suggestions about what to ex-
pect from the Paris Agreement’s reliance on shaming as a compliance 
incentive.  Finally, I explain why the fervent populism that has 
129. Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.2.
130. Ahmad et al., supra note 10, at 284.
131. See Jessica F. Green, Blurred Lines: Public-Private Interactions in Carbon Regula-
tions, 43 INTL. INTERACTIONS 103 (2017) (noting the important role played by nongovernmen-
tal organizations); Robert O. Keohane & Michael Oppenheimer, Paris: Beyond the Climate 
Dead End Through Pledge and Review?, 4 POL. & GOVERNANCE 142, 148 (2016) (noting that 
“domestic politics is crucial in determining whether multilateral institutions can be effective”). 
It should be noted that the transparency that the Paris Agreement seeks to promote will likely 
make as much of a difference for domestic actors who are able to put pressure on their own 
government’s leaders than for facilitating a global system of naming and shaming. 
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emerged around the world in recent years will likely prove one of the 
major stumbling blocks to climate progress under the Paris Agreement. 
The growing influence of populist appeals to nationalism in many 
countries will make it harder than ever to secure fidelity to the global 
climate accord because the accord expressly leaves it up to each indi-
vidual country to establish their goals and determine the pace and 
methods of achieving them. 
A. Incentives for Voluntary Environmental Action
At the level of domestic environmental policy, governments
around the world have tried to encourage private companies to make 
voluntary commitments to improve their environmental performance. 
They have established numerous programs that seek “to change private 
sector behavior not by requiring compliance with mandatory regula-
tions, but by offering often modest incentives, such as access to infor-
mation and positive public recognition.”132  As these programs rely on 
a similar peer-pressure incentive model as the Paris Agreement, expe-
rience with these programs can be instructive in discerning what it is 
reasonable to expect from an international agreement that essentially 
calls on nation states to undertake voluntary environmental action. 
Among its many voluntary environmental programs, the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) National Environmental Per-
formance Track was considered to be the agency’s flagship voluntary 
program.133  In operation from 2000 to 2009, Performance Track en-
couraged—but did not require—industrial facilities to set environmen-
tal improvement goals and adopt management systems to achieve 
those goals.  Facilities that volunteered to join this program received 
little more than some limited recognition from the EPA as environ-
mental leaders.  EPA envisioned peer pressure as among the motivat-
ing factors that would encourage top-performing firms to set and 
achieve ambitious goals, as well as for more average companies to be 
motivated to keep pace with the top performers.134 
Even though Performance Track applied domestically, the design 
of the program bears some similarity to the Paris Agreement. Member-
ship in Performance Track hinged on facilities setting their own 
132. Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Motivating without Mandates? The Role of Vol-
untary Programs in Environmental Governance, in DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 237, 237–52 (Lee Paddock et al. eds., 2016). 
133. Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons from
the Rise and Fall of EPA’s “Flagship” Voluntary Program, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 63–
64 (2014). 
134. Id. at 12-15.
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environmental goals and then developing and implementing internal 
plans to help them attain and document their progress—essentially a 
management-based design.  With respect to the Paris Agreement, the 
voluntary commitments that a country makes under the Agreement can 
and often will call for the imposition of mandatory rules imposed on 
that country’s industrial firms, but the choice of the goals and the pol-
icy plan to achieve those goals is left up to each nation’s domestic gov-
ernment, much as it was with each industrial facility in the case of Per-
formance Track.  
What clues might a domestic voluntary management-based pro-
gram offer for a global climate accord that also depends on voluntary 
commitments?  In a multi-year empirical study of Performance Track, 
Jennifer Nash and I sought to understand why some facilities joined 
the program and others did not.135  We found little evidence that the 
program led to any substantial changes in facilities’ environmental per-
formance.136  Indeed, contrary to what the program’s name might im-
ply, the facilities that participated in the program—which were only a 
“tiny fraction” of all regulated facilities137—were not necessarily dis-
tinguished by their superior environmental performance.138  The 
EPA’s own Inspector General reported that “most members do not 
make the environmental progress anticipated when they set commit-
ments.”139  Although facilities recognized by the program were sup-
posed to have a strong compliance record, the Inspector General also 
found that about 27% of the facilities in the program had violated en-
vironmental regulations.140  Performance Track had even recognized a 
number of “facilities with more compliance problems or more toxic 
releases than their sector [peer facilities’] averages.”141 Rather than 
consistently attracting the best environmental leaders, what distin-
guished the facilities that joined Performance Track turned out to be 
more their managers’ eagerness to be recognized as leaders than any 
135. Id.
136. Id. at 56 (“EPA drew into its program those facilities that sought out government
recognition and emphasized the importance of maintaining good public relations. These were 
the more extroverted facilities, not necessarily the top environmental performers.”) 
137. Id. at 83; see also id. at 63 (noting that “Performance Track attracted less than 0.1%
of its membership pool”). 
138. Id. at 81–82.
139. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AG., PERFORMANCE TRACK
COULD IMPROVE PROGRAM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT TO ENSURE VALUE 15 (Rep. No. 2007-
P-00013, 2007), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/20070329-
2007-p-00013.pdf.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id. at 26.
168 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:5 
superior environmental performance by their facilities.142 Participating 
facilities tended to be ones with managers who valued the reputational 
benefits that came from EPA declaring them a top environmental per-
former. 
The EPA has had similar experiences with its other voluntary en-
vironmental programs; few, if any, have yielded any indication of sig-
nificant environmental improvements.143  On occasion these programs 
have been shown to prompt businesses to reduce their pollution, but at 
most they tend to yield only relatively modest and short-lived improve-
ments.144  Much of the same can be said of a popular set of nongovern-
mental environmental management standards—ISO 14001—which 
are also not mandatory and do not require any specific levels of envi-
ronmental performance.145  Among the studies that have tried to meas-
ure the environmental effects of the ISO 14001 standards, the research 
conducted by Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski stands out for its 
robustness, but even Prakash and Potoski find only “modest” effects 
from these standards.146  Compared to facilities without a certified ISO 
environmental management system, facilities with an ISO-certified en-
vironmental management stayed in compliance with binding govern-
ment regulations on average only one week longer each year, and cer-
tified facilities appear to have ranked only about three percentiles 
cleaner in terms of their toxic discharges.147 
The modest impacts of domestic voluntary environmental pro-
grams suggest limitations that are likely in store for the Paris Agree-
ment—with full recognition, of course, of the differences between do-
mestic and international settings.  It is true that, with respect to the 
Paris Agreement, if national leaders find themselves sufficiently moti-
vated to reduce their countries’ greenhouse gas emissions, they can 
142. See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 133, at 11, 82.
143. See, e.g., Chris Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, The Politics of Regulation: From Insti-
tutionalism to New Governance, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 107, 116-18 (2011). 
144. See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 132, at 238 (concluding that “the impacts of vol-
untary programs are mixed, with at best some evidence of small, positive results from a few 
programs”); Richard D. Morgenstern & William A. Pizer, The Effectiveness of Voluntary En-
vironmental Programs, RFF POL’Y COMMENTARY (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.rff.org/ 
blog/2008/effectiveness-voluntary-environmental-programs (noting that “[a]mong the cases 
that we studied, the evidence showed that some initial gains may not persist” with “the most 
profitable gains … taken early and the most cooperative firms join[ing] first, with the result 
that the program may lose momentum over time”). 
145. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Bolstering Private-Sector Environmental
Management, 17 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 69-74 (2001). 
146. ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: 
GREEN CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 166 (2006). 
147. Id.
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always choose to achieve those goals in their countries by using tradi-
tional regulatory tools backed up by meaningful incentives for private 
firms to reduce their emissions.  The question is simply whether na-
tional leaders will be so motivated.  It is telling that with the voluntary 
program that was given highest profile by EPA—Performance 
Track—no more than a tiny fraction of polluting facilities stepped for-
ward to participate in the program and deliver meaningful improve-
ments in their environmental performance.148 The experience with do-
mestic voluntary environmental programs suggests that only small 
fraction of national leaders are likely to step forward to make sus-
tained, costly policy commitments, especially when they face internal 
opposition from their nations’ business leaders and other elites. 
B. Shame and the Social Side of Sanctions
Voluntary environmental programs offer positive reputational in-
centives in the form of recognition of participating businesses as envi-
ronmental leaders.  But negative reputational incentives are also avail-
able to motivate behavior.  What can social science research say about 
the Paris Agreement’s reliance on negative reputational incentives—
that is, shaming—to motivate countries to undertake and sustain am-
bitious climate action?  
The Paris Agreement is by no means the first legal regime to rely 
on shaming as a mechanism for motivating behavioral change.149 At 
the domestic level, many regulations compel private businesses to dis-
close information in the hope of increasing the risk of shaming.150 Ex-
amples include requirements that factories disclose the amount of toxic 
pollution they release into the environment,151 and mandates that food 
manufacturers disclose the calories contained in their food products.152 
These information disclosure requirements—which have sometimes 
been explicitly described as “regulation by shaming”153—rely at least 
148. See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 133, at 63 (noting that Performance Track at-
tracted less than 0.1% of environmentally permitted facilities in the United States). 
149. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes explicitly use the term “shaming” to
describe a common strategy for inducing compliance with international norms. CHAYES & 
CHAYES, supra note 11, at 110-11. 
150. See Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental
Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Infor-
mational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999). 
151. See, e.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, § 313,
42 U.S.C. § 11023. 
152. See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R. § 101.9.
153. See, e.g., Mary Graham, Regulation by Shaming, ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 2000),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/04/regulation-by-shaming/378126/. 
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in part on the hope that companies will improve their products or in-
dustrial processes in order to avoid negative repercussions from cus-
tomers or other key actors.154  
Some observers have hailed such disclosure laws as highly effec-
tive,155 while others have questioned whether they truly make much of 
a difference at all.156  Too often, though, the debate over information 
disclosure lacks systematic evidence.  The most rigorous research avail-
able paints at best a mixed picture.157  Information disclosure can induce 
behavioral change—but regulation by shaming has not proven a major 
impetus for substantial, costly changes.  When laws compel immedi-
ately accessible, understandable information that helps consumers in 
their decision-making, they may well activate market pressures to in-
duce at least some modest behavioral changes—but the evidence sug-
gests that these effects are far from a sure thing.158  Overall, the risk of 
negative reputational harm from information disclosure—regulation by 
shaming—hardly seems compelling enough to provide a shining exam-
ple of what shaming will accomplish for the Paris Agreement. 
Furthermore, when designers of a legal regime think they have 
created a structure that will lead to shaming, they need to consider that 
the system could turn out, at least for some individuals or entities, to 
work in a fashion opposite of what is intended.  Shaming does not al-
ways work as planned because behavior that leads some people to ex-
perience shame can provide others with a badge of honor.159  
154. Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 150; Cary Coglianese & Christopher Carrigan,
Nudges as Regulatory Tools (2018) (unpublished manuscript). 
155. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 189 (2008) (characterizing toxic information dis-
closure regulation as “the most unambiguous success” in U.S. environmental law); Archon 
Fung & Dara O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots Up: Ex-
plaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL. MGT. 115, 
116 (2000) (claiming that toxic information disclosure regulation “has proven to be one of the 
most successful programs to reduce toxics in EPA history”); Eric W. Orts, Defending Disclo-
sure, REG. REV. (June 18, 2015), https://www.theregreview.org/2015/06/18/orts-defending-
disclosure/ (noting “many situations where mandatory disclosure just might—and very often 
does—seem to work”) (emphasis in original). 
156. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014). 
157. See, e.g., JAMES HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION (2005) (“The sepa-
rate and exact impacts that the provision of information has on toxic emissions are, to date, 
unknown.”). 
158. See Daniel Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 
YALE L. J. 574, 577 (2012); Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product 
Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q. J. ECON. 409, 410 (2003). 
159. See, e.g., Asa Fitch, Iranian President Promises to ‘Break’ New U.S. Sanctions, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-president-promises-to-break-new-us-
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Most criminologists recognize that “shame and shaming are com-
plex issues.”160  Not everyone subjected to disapproval will feel shame 
nor necessarily be motivated by the dissatisfaction to modify their be-
havior.161  For example, it would be reasonable to expect that, when 
compliance with the law is reinforced by the threat of criminal sanc-
tions, these sanctions will themselves induce shame.  After all, for most 
people the experience of being found guilty of having committed a 
crime—to be labeled a “criminal”—would be one of the most shameful 
experiences imaginable.  But this is not true for everyone.  Some indi-
viduals experience little or no shame; they find being arrested little 
more than a minor hassle.162 
Empirical research suggests that individuals’ social ties help de-
termine how they will react to signs of disapproval.  The threat of crim-
inal sanction, for instance, is perceived as more severe when it will 
disrupt existing relationships and prompt disapproval from within an 
individual’s social network.163  People are most susceptible to shaming 
by those within their networks; the more they are removed from rela-
tionships with those who express disapproval, or the more they can 
easily leave those relationships, the less prone they will be to feeling 
shame and wanting to align their behavior with the preferences of those 
who have expressed their disapproval.164 
When it comes to predicting what the Paris Agreement’s reliance 
on shaming might be able to achieve, the research would suggest that 
national leaders will be much less prone to experiencing shame in re-
sponse to disapproval from other nations than from members of their 
own publics.  Such an implication is reinforced by political economy 
research on two-level games.  National leaders playing on an interna-
tional stage (i.e., one game level) must also remain mindful of how their 
actions will be received back home (i.e., a second game level).165  
sanctions-1541413178 (describing Iranian President Rouhani’s pride in breaking U.S. sanctions). 
160. Charles R. Tittle et al., A Test of Micro-Level Application of Shaming Theory, 50 SOC. 
PROBS. 592, 612 (2003). 
161. One study reports a seemingly paradoxical response to media coverage of wrongdo-
ing by investment banks: they fare better, not worse, in business deals. Thomas J. Roulet, Sins 
for Some, Virtues for Others: Media Coverage of Investment Banks’ Misconduct and Adher-
ence to Professional Norms During the Financial Crisis, HUM. REL. (forthcoming 2018) (not-
ting that “investment banks actually seem to benefit from engaging in disapproved norms”).  
162. See Sheldon Ekland-Olson et al., The Paradoxical Impact of Criminal Sanctions:
Some Microstructural Findings, 18 L. & SOC’Y REV. 159, 162 (1984). 
163. See id.
164. See Sally Engle Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in TOWARD A GENERAL 
THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 288 (Donald Black ed., vol. 2 1984). 
165. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
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In the United States, this means that a first-term President who is 
a Republican will be more responsive to disapproval from voters in 
Republican primaries than to disapproval from other countries’ repre-
sentatives.  As U.S. voters are highly polarized over climate change, 
with Republican voters markedly less concerned than Democratic vot-
ers,166 it should be little wonder that every major Republican presiden-
tial candidate in the 2016 primary elections criticized climate regula-
tion.167  Nor should it be surprising that, within six months of taking 
his oath of office, President Trump declared his intention to withdraw 
from the Paris Agreement.168 
The widely-respected criminologist John Braithwaite has situated 
shaming at the center of both legal compliance and social change, but 
even he recognizes that some types of shaming—in particular, stigma-
tizing ones—can backfire and actually increase deviant behavior.169  In 
addition, there may sometimes be a rather fine line between deviance 
and defiance.  Defiance that may seem to be deviant in some contexts 
may turn out instead not to be so deviant in others. In the United States, 
for example, “[d]efiance of authority runs deep in American history 
and culture, perhaps even deeper than the pressure for financial suc-
cess.”170  Defiance may actually be deemed acceptable behavior in 
some social circumstances. 
Games, 42 INTL. ORG. 427, 434 (1988). 
166. Abundant polling data show the wide divergence in partisan views about climate
change, with only a modest fraction of Republicans expressing concern, compared with large 
proportions of Democrats. See, e.g., Frank Newport, Public Opinion and Trump’s Decision on 
the Paris Agreement, GALLUP (June 2, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-mat-
ters/211682/public-opinion-trump-decision-paris-agreement.aspx?version=print (“On almost 
every environment and climate change and global warming issue we have tested, there are 
major partisan gaps.”). Not only does political ideology affect general concern about climate 
change, but it also seems to drive action. See Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Energy 
Conservation “Nudges” and Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized Resi-
dential Electricity Field Experiment, 11 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 680, 680 (2013) (“We show that 
the popular electricity conservation ‘nudge’ of providing feedback to households on own and 
peers’ home electricity usage in a home electricity report is two to four times more effective 
with political liberals than with conservatives.”). 
167. See Emma Foehringer Merchant, How the 2016 Presidential Candidates View Cli-
mate Change, NEW REPUB. (Nov. 29, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/124381/2016-
presidential-candidates-view-climate-change. 
168. For a discussion of Republican antipathy toward the Paris Agreement, see Andrew
Prokop, Don’t Just Blame Trump for Quitting the Paris Deal—Blame the Republican Party, 
VOX (June 1, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/6/1/15726726/trump-paris-climate-agree-
ment-republicans. 
169. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 4 (1989) (pointing out that
“shaming can be counterproductive if it is disintegrative rather than reintegrative”). 
170. Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Crim-
inal Sanction, 30 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 445, 462 (1993). 
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What criminologist Larry Sherman has written about defiance 
more generally might well fit the current President’s defiance of the 
international community and his domestic critics:171 
When poorly bonded offenders deny the shame they 
feel and respond with rage, the unfair stigmatizing 
sanction will increase their future rates of offending. 
This unacknowledged shame leads to an emotion of an-
gry pride at defying the punishment.  That pride predis-
poses the defiant offender to repeat the sanctioned con-
duct, symbolically labeling the sanctioner or sanc-
tions—and not the offenders own acts—as truly shame-
ful and morally deserving of punishment.172 
In other words, defying an authority seen as illegitimate can be viewed 
as a matter of pride, not a source of shame.  This finding is consistent 
with an extensive body of research on procedural justice that shows 
that, when legal controls are not viewed as legitimate, they elicit less 
respect.173  
The Paris Agreement’s reliance on shaming from the larger inter-
national community offers little to constrain a powerful country like 
the United States when its leaders do not have domestic political rea-
sons to take climate change seriously.  It should hardly be surprising 
that a Republican President has acted antagonistically toward the Paris 
Agreement.  The typical Republican voter tends to view international 
institutions run by foreign elites as illegitimate.174  The fact that the 
171. President Trump seems at times to relish defiance, both provoking criticism and also
turning it back on his critics. He frequently complains of unfair treatment by those who ques-
tion him. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Victor or Victim? Trump’s Changing Response to Mueller 
Report, N.Y. TIMES (April 25, 2019), at A15 (noting how President Trump often “lapses into 
anger and resentment, convinced that he has been unfairly treated and determined to strike 
back”). For example, the release of a redacted version of a report prepared by Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller provided evidence of multiple acts of obstruction of justice by President 
Trump, but rather that responding with shame, Trump lashed out with rage on Twitter and 
charged that the Special Counsel report had been written by “Angry Democrats and Trump 
Haters”—that the Special Counsel’s staff members, in other words, were the ones who en-
gaged in the truly shameful conduct.  Id. 
172. Sherman, supra note 170, at 461.
173. See, e.g., Judd B. Kessler & Stephen Leider, Procedural Fairness and the Cost of
Control, 32 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 685 (2016); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW: 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND COMPLIANCE 5 (1990). 
174. Jacob Poushter, Favorable Views of the UN Prevail in Europe, Asia and the U.S.,
PEW RESEARCH (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/20/favora-
ble-views-of-the-un-prevail-in-europe-asia-and-u-s/ (reporting a “partisan divide” on favora-
ble attitudes toward the United Nations starting around 2004, as “views of the UN among 
Republicans had plummeted below 50% and have not recovered”). 
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Paris Agreement was a major achievement of a Democratic President, 
and addressed an issue to which the typical Republican voter expresses 
general indifference,175 has made it more appealing for Republican 
leaders to act defiantly toward the Paris Agreement, even or especially 
in the face of disapproval from international actors.  Much of the same 
will be true in other countries when domestic political incentives sup-
port defiance.  An international treaty that lives by disapproval, 
through shaming, can also die by disapproval, through defiance. 
C. Populism and the Paris Agreement’s Achilles Heel
It would be premature, of course, to suggest that the Paris Agree-
ment is already lying at its death bed.  Global action to mitigate climate 
change still enjoys considerable support around the world as evidenced 
by continued transnational efforts to implement the Paris Agreement 
framework.176  Even in the United States, opposition to the Agreement 
by the Trump Administration has not dampened broad public support 
for climate action; indeed, it probably has emboldened it, at least 
among Democrats.177  Business leaders in the United States have con-
tinued to support climate action;178 states and localities have pursued 
their own climate policy initiatives;179 and a substantial segment of the 
175. According to a public opinion survey conducted in November 2016, 86 percent of
Democrats favored U.S. participation in the Paris Agreement, while only about forty-seven 
percent of Trump supporters did. Jennifer Marlon et al., Majorities of Americans in Every 
State Support Participation in the Paris Agreement, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMUNICATION (May 8, 2017), https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/paris_ 
agreement_by_state/. A few months before President Trump announced his intention to with-
draw the United States from the Paris Agreement, ninety percent of Democrats reported that 
they worried about climate change “a great deal/fair amount,” while only 36 percent of Re-
publicans did. Megan Brenan & Lydia Saad, Global Warming Concern Steady Despite Some 
Partisan Shifts (Mar. 28, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/231530/global-warming-con-
cern-steady-despite-partisan-shifts.aspx. 
176. See Umair Irfan, Countries Have Forged a Climate Deal in Poland—Despite Trump,
VOX (Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/12/14/18139402/ 
cop24-climate-change-katowice-poland (describing the COP24 climate change negotiations 
between 200 nations). 
177. Brenan & Saad, supra note 175 (“With Trump reversing many of his predecessors’
policies aimed at curbing global warming, Democrats are feeling a greater sense of urgency 
about the issue, while Republicans have either remained as skeptical as they had been in the 
past or have become more so.”). 
178. See, e.g., Bradley Olson & Timothy Puko, Conservative Group Will Push for a Car-
bon Tax, a Contrast to GOP Resistance, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/ar-
ticles/new-conservative-political-group-to-push-for-u-s-carbon-tax-1529444820; George P. 
Shultz & Lawrence H. Summers, This is the One Climate Solution That’s Best for the Envi-
ronment – and for Business, WASH. POST (June 19, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/this-is-the-one-climate-solution-thats-best-for-the-environment—and-
for-business/2017/06/19/9736b72c-542f-11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html. 
179. See, e.g., Michael Greshko, Map Shows Growing U.S. ‘Climate Rebellion’ Against
Trump, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 8, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/06/ 
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population still sees climate change as a serious problem in need of 
action.180  Furthermore, the federal government’s posture toward cli-
mate change could readily pivot again, should Americans elect a Dem-
ocratic President in 2020.  Overall, climate policy optimists can view 
the disparate but strong pockets of support at all levels of government 
around the world as building blocks for meaningful future progress 
within the management-based structure of the Paris Agreement.181  
Optimism should not, though, lead anyone to overlook what may 
be the most serious threat to future global climate action: populism. 
The emergence of a strong wave of populist and nationalistic fervor 
has roughly coincided with the period during which nations crafted, 
adopted, and launched the Paris Agreement.182  During this period, 
populism has manifested itself in, among other developments, the 
Brexit movement in the United Kingdom, the election of Donald 
Trump in the United States, the Yellow Vest movement in France, and 
the election of a nationalist leader in Brazil.183  Each of these move-
 
states-cities-usa-climate-policy-environment/. The America’s Pledge initiative launched by 
Michael Bloomberg and Jerry Brown claims that efforts by states and localities, as well as 
voluntary actions by private businesses, have already brought the United States about halfway 
to its pledged reductions of greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement. Fulfilling 
America’s Pledge, BLOOMBERG, 9 (2018), https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/28/2018/09/Ful-
filling-Americas-Pledge-2018.pdf. 
180. In March 2018, the Gallup polling organization reported that “[s]ixty-two percent of
Americans currently say the government is doing too little to protect the environment, the 
highest [such figure] in twelve years.” Frank Newport, Americans Want Government to Do 
More on Environment, GALLUP (Mar. 29, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/232007/ameri-
cans-want-government-more-environment.aspx. A full seventy percent of survey respondents 
between the ages of 18 to 34 reported worrying “a great deal” or a “fair amount” about climate 
change. R.J. Reinhart, Global Warming Age Gap: Younger Americans Most Worried, GALLUP 
(May 11, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/234314/global-warming-age-gap-younger-
americans-worried.aspx?version=print.  
181. See Richard B. Stewart et al., Building Blocks: A Strategy for Near-Term Action
Within the New Global Climate Framework, 144 CLIM. CHANGE. 1 (2017). Of course, too 
much optimism might prove counterproductive, if it lessens public pressure for more effective 
national and international interventions. See Cary Coglianese & Shana Starobin, Let’s Be Real 
About State and Local Climate Action, REG. REV. (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.theregre-
view.org/2018/02/20/coglianese-starobin-state-local-climate-action; Cary Coglianese & Joce-
lyn D’Ambrosio, Policymaking Under Pressure: The Perils of Incremental Responses to Cli-
mate Change, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1415 (2008). 
182. Political analyst Ian Bremmer expresses a common view that traces current populist
antipathy toward globalism to the fallout of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, with major man-
ifestations of this new tide of populism occurring in just the last several years. IAN BREMMER, 
US VS. THEM: THE FAILURE OF GLOBALISM 12-13 (2018). 
183. See, e.g., Andy Langenkamp, Predictions of Populism’s Demise Were Premature,
THE HILL (Apr. 20, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/international/439755-reports-of-popu-
lisms-demise-were-premature. Beyond President Trump’s intended withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, populist movements around the world hold implications for global climate action. 
See, e.g., Jean Chemnick, How Brexit Could Impact the U.K.’s Climate Goals, SCIENTIFIC 
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ments has a distinct narrative, but the recent wave of populism around 
the world does reveal that many members of the public question pre-
vailing domestic institutions (including science), and they take an es-
pecially dim view of global institutions.184  As political scientists Pippa 
Norris and Ronald Inglehart have observed, populism today “concerns 
the need to defend ‘Us’ (‘our tribe’) through restrictions on ‘Them’ 
(‘the other’).”185  It prioritizes “the protection of national sovereignty, 
secure borders, a strong military, and trade protectionism (‘America 
First’), rather than membership of the European Union, diplomatic al-
liances, human rights, international engagement, and multilateral co-
operation within the G7, NATO, and United Nations.”186 
Under such political circumstances, perhaps the Paris Agree-
ment’s management-based approach might actually seem at first 
glance to make it less susceptible to populist attack.  After all, its bot-
tom-up orientation expressly seeks to accommodate, if not even rein-
force, the primacy of national sovereignty in decision-making about 
energy and the environment.  An international agreement in which 
each country makes its own goals and tracks its own progress should 
surely allow for greater expression of views from “us” than from 
“them.”  The Paris Agreement’s flexibility, and the voluntary nature of 
any substantive action that countries commit to take under it, might 
very well be seen as a source of resilience, keeping more countries 
from announcing plans to leave the climate accord. 
Only the future will tell, and it is certainly possible that most 
countries will stay on board with the Paris process—at least as a formal 
matter.  But such an outcome is by no means guaranteed.  The Paris 
AMER. (Mar. 28, 2019); Nives Dolsak & Aseem Prakash, Can the Climate Movement Survive 
Populism? Lessons from ‘Yellow Vest’ Protests, THE HILL (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/419953-can-the-climate-movement-survive-
populism-lessons-from-yellow-vest (noting how the climate movement is facing populist 
backlash in France); Lisa Viscidi & Nate Graham, Brazil Was a Global Leader on Climate 
Change. Now It’s a Threat., FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 4, 2019), https://foreignpol-
icy.com/2019/01/04/brazil-was-a-global-leader-on-climate-change-now-its-a-threat/ (ex-
plaining how the new Brazilian president once “threatened to withdraw Brazil from the Paris 
agreement” and “withdrew [the country’s] offer to host the [next international] climate con-
ference”). 
184. For helpful discussions, see Eric A. Posner, Liberal Internationalism and the Populist
Backlash, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 795 (2017); BENJAMIN MOFFIT, THE GLOBAL RISE OF POPULISM: 
PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL STYLE, AND REPRESENTATION 45 (2016); Mark B. Brown, Climate 
Science, Populism, and the Democracy of Rejection, in CULTURE, POLITICS AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: HOW INFORMATION SHAPES OUR COMMON FUTURE 129 (Deserai A. Crow & Max-
well T. Boykoff eds., 2014). 
185. PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURAL BACKLASH: TRUMP, BREXIT, AND 
AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM 8 (2019). 
186. Id.
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Agreement’s flexibility and voluntary nature have so far not kept pop-
ulist elected leaders in countries such as the United States and Brazil 
from lambasting it.187  In his withdrawal announcement in 2017, Pres-
ident Trump mischaracterized, perhaps deliberately, the degree to 
which the Agreement constrains U.S. sovereignty.188  For political 
leaders, what matters in an era of populism will not be the flexibility 
that the Paris Agreement actually provides, but rather what the Agree-
ment represents to some segments of the public: a symbol of a distant, 
global elite that is out of touch with the lives of ordinary citizens.  
If that symbolism takes root firmly, and climate action comes to 
be seen as a luxury for the well-to-do, the Paris Agreement could risk 
becoming meaningless.  The Agreement’s essential energy could be-
come easily depleted even if countries remain in it—and that is because 
of its management-based flexibility.  Even among parties to the Agree-
ment, the degree of ambition in their climate commitments and actions 
could wane significantly.  The Paris Agreement’s management-based 
design will make it relatively easy for countries to slow down their 
progress without having to take the visible step of formally withdraw-
ing from the Agreement.  The very feature of the Agreement that 
proved instrumental in securing the agreement of all the countries of 
the world—its flexible management-based design—may ultimately 
just make it easier for countries to shirk their commitments and stall 
on making emissions reductions. 
To be sure, the relative risks created by the Agreement’s manage-
ment-based nature should not be overstated.  A top-down climate 
change accord with binding emissions restrictions backed up by sanc-
tions would hardly be immune from populist backlash.  In 2011, Can-
ada withdrew from the top-down Kyoto Protocol even though it had 
previously ratified the Protocol—and it made its withdrawal without 
incurring any serious repercussions.189  
187. See Putnam, supra note 165.
188. In his withdrawal statement in June 2017, for example, President Trump criticized
the “draconian financial and economic burdens the agreement imposes on our country” and 
the “onerous energy restrictions it has placed on the United States,” even though the Agree-
ment places no substantive legal obligations on the United States or any other country. Re-
marks, supra note 5.  He earned a round of applause for stating that “our withdrawal from the 
agreement represents a reassertion of America’s sovereignty.” Id. See also id. (“And exiting 
the agreement protects the United States from future intrusions on the United States’ sover-
eignty and massive future legal liability.”). See generally Ahmad et al., supra note 10, at 283-
84; Nina Hachigian, Trump Doesn’t Actually Care About U.S. Sovereignty, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(June 2, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/02/trump-doesnt-actually-care-about-u-s-
sovereignty/. 
189. Canada Pulls Out of Kyoto Protocol, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www. 
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Yet even though a management-based agreement is not alone in 
its vulnerability to populism, its design does create some greater de-
gree of vulnerability.  When domestic political incentives dictate, pop-
ulist leaders can and probably will still withdraw from management-
based agreements just as they can any other kind of international agree-
ment—but they can also just slow-walk their countries’ progress while 
still staying within the four corners of the Agreement.  In other words, 
the management-based nature of the Paris Agreement gives a populist 
leader greater flexibility to find politically rewarding or acceptable 
ways to undercut progress toward emissions reductions.190     
In the end, the degree to which the Paris Agreement will foster 
climate progress will likely depend on how deeply populism embeds 
itself and how widely it spreads.  It is possible that the harms that con-
tinue to be inflicted on the world’s people from the ravages of climate 
change—such as increased coastal flooding, more sustained droughts, 
and expansive forest fires—may tragically help to counteract compla-
cency and turn back populist resistance to climate action.191  The oc-
currence of such natural disasters could potentially make the costs of 
greenhouse gas emissions more tangible to members of the public, 
which would make it easier to mobilize social and political support for 
stronger climate measures.192   
Still, difficulties in mobilizing around climate change will remain. 
Due to the somewhat abstract nature of “climate” as a concept, climate 
change will probably always be a difficult issue around which to 
theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/13/canada-pulls-out-kyoto-protocol. 
190. It has been suggested that a management-based Paris Agreement may turn out to be
more resilient in the face of a withdrawal of a major emitting nation like the United States than 
was the top-down Kyoto Protocol, simply because the former has earned the commitment of 
a larger number of nations, making the loss of any one nation (even a large one) not as conse-
quential. Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: Paris and Kyoto Have a Lot More in Common Than 
You Might Think, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/pow-
erpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2017/06/14/the-energy-202-paris-and-kyoto-have-a-lot-more-
in-common-than-you-might-think/59400252e9b69b2fb981dd02/. Ultimately, this too is an 
empirical question. But it is also plausible that the Paris Agreement will take on the appearance 
of greater resilience, simply because one formal withdrawal does not precipitate other formal 
withdrawals, while masking potentially greater vulnerability. One country’s withdrawal could 
prompt widespread backsliding which would be more worrisome if it is less visible than formal 
withdrawals, leading under a management-based agreement to the appearance of greater com-
mitment by the parties than exists in reality.  
191. Ove Hoegh-Guldberg et al., Impacts of 1.5ºC Global Warming on Natural and Hu-
man Systems Supplementary Material, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C 175, 178-79, 181, 220 
(Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds. 2018). 
192. See Cary Coglianese & Mark Nevitt, The U.S. Already Has a Carbon Tax, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 23, 2019), at A21. 
2019] PLEDGING, POPULISM, AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT 179 
mobilize the public.193  That will continue to make it harder for climate 
action to compete against populist movements founded in fear, anger, 
and deep-seated cultural beliefs.  As long as populism remains vibrant 
around the world, and as long as global efforts remain anathema to a 
sizable portion of domestic publics, many elected officials will find it 
in their interest to resist taking meaningful steps to mitigate climate 
change. 
Countering popular nationalist movements will also be hampered 
by the persistence of the economic and social conditions that have fos-
tered the emergence of these movements, such as growing inequality, 
disruptive technologies in the economy, and the easy access to social 
media for airing grievances.194  The factors contributing to the rise of 
contemporary populism cannot be ignored, especially because they are 
likely to remain for some time to come.  For any domestic political 
action to be effective in addressing global climate change, environ-
mentalists and other political actors will need to broaden the scope of 
their efforts, finding direct ways to resist nationalistic populism at the 
same time as they continue to push for climate action.195 
CONCLUSION 
Populist movements around the world pose a real threat to pro-
gress in addressing global climate change.  In allowing countries to set 
their own goals and pace in meeting them, the Paris Agreement’s man-
agement-based structure could very well make climate progress even 
more vulnerable to weakening in the face of populism.196  The Agree-
ment might even prove to be one of global governance’s last gasps, at 
least for some time to come.  If such an outcome is to be forestalled, 
and if the Paris Agreement is to stand a chance of providing even a 
modest impetus for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, its success will 
almost certainly depend on domestic political forces that will need to 
push back against the current wave of nationalistic populism.  What 
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will be needed is an anti-populist populism to provide national political 
leaders with incentives to undertake robust climate mitigation efforts 
and to continue to cooperate on a global stage.  
It is a paradox of the Paris Agreement’s management-based ap-
proach that the success of this signature international climate law 
hinges, in the end, on domestic politics—to a degree greater than other 
international agreements.  Domestic politics is, after all, hard-wired 
into the Paris Agreement’s bottom-up, management-based structure.197 
The incentives for making ambitious national commitments, and fol-
lowing through on them, thus depend first and foremost on political 
leaders’ domestic audiences.198  Only if the political costs to climate 
inaction become palpable will national leaders be likely to undertake 
the hard, risky steps that climate action requires—today and in the 
years to come.  In the end, domestic politics is where global coopera-
tion over climate change will rise or fall. 
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